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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
PLimtiH/Apixlhuil,
Case No. 20040537-CA

vs.
SCOTT DAVID FERRY,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Vi' VTMMI'N I1 < IK JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this mallei pur*'..; :

t-c provisions of

Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESEN i ('! J \ 'V: \ 1 \ \ ! I \ l{ I)S (»f k S \ i 1'\\
1.

Whether the evidence was insufficient to establish that Ferry had the power and

intent to exercise control over the paraphernalia and drug in question? "The standard of
review when the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial is challenged is well
established. [Tjhe evidence and the reasonable inferences which might be drawn
therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. A jury
conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence only when, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted."

State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App. 1991). Because this issue was not
preserved below, it is reviewed for plain error. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^f 11, 10
P.3d 346. Alternatively, this issue should be reviewed to determine whether defense
counsel's failure to move for a directed verdict constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel? Where the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time
on direct appeal, the issue is resolved as a matter of law. State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177,
1179 (Utah App.), cert denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (1994).
2.

Whether Ferry was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of

counsel at trial where trial counsel failed to timely file a motion to suppress statements
made to a police officer? In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the
defendant's burden to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in
some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment, and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the
defendant." State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, Tf25, 1 P.3d 546 (citations omitted). Where the
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the
issue is resolved as a matter of law. Cosey, 873 P.2d at 1179.

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All controlling statutory provisions and rules are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Scott David Ferry appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the
Third District Court after being found guilty of possession of a controlled substance, a
third degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class B misdemeanor.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

Scott David Ferry was charged by information filed in the Third Judicial District
Court on or about January 3, 2003, with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); and unlawful
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated §58-37a-(5)(l) (R. 2-3).
A preliminary hearing was held on May 8, 2003, and Ferry was bound over for
trial (R. 18).
On July 25, 2003, Ferry filed a Motion to Suppress Statements Made to the Police,
asserting that his statements were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment (R. 7779). Trial counsel requested the trial court to consider the motion to suppress despite its
untimeliness on the morning of trial, July 30, 2003, but the trial court denied the motion
for late filing pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (R. 197: 37).

Jury trial was held on July 30, 2003 (R. 197). The jury found Ferry guilty of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, and unlawful
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (R. 134-35).
Sentencing was held on June 14, 2004 (R. 175). Based on Ferry's conviction of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, he was sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 175). Prison time is to run
consecutive with Federal prison time (R. 176). And based on Ferry's conviction of use or
possession of drug paraphernalia, he was sentenced to a term of 180 days in jail, total
time suspended (R. 176). Ferry was also placed on probation for 36 months (R. 176).
On June 21, 2004, Ferry timely filed a Notice of Appeal from the judgment,
sentence, and commitment in this case in the Third District Court and this action
commenced (R. 177).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Testimony of Deputy Kent Cameron
Kent Cameron is employed with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, and on
November 15, 2002, in the early morning, he was patrolling near 40th West and 52nd
South (R. 197: 13-14). Cameron saw a Ford Tempo driving with no headlights on and
proceeded to stop the vehicle (R. 197: 14-15).
Once he stopped the vehicle, Cameron observed wCa lot of subtle movement,
particularly the driver, I - the driver almost looked like he was bending forward, reaching
down to the floor, and I seen his arms and shoulders kinda moving" (R. 197: 15).

Cameron could see that four people were in the vehicle, but the driver was the one doing
the moving (R. 197: 15, 16). Cameron also testified that it appeared that the driver bent
all the way down and placed something on the floor (R. 197: 29).
The driver was Corey Park (R. 197: 17, 29). Ferry was sitting directly behind
Corey Park (R. 197: 18). Cameron asked the driver and passengers to step out of the
vehicle (R. 197: 18). Ferry went outside to the back of the vehicle with another officer
and then Cameron saw a syringe lying on the floor behind the driver's seat (R. 197: 19).
After seeing the syringe, Cameron went over to Ferry and asked him if he knew the
syringe was there (R. 179: 20). Cameron testified that Ferry told him "he knew the
syringe was there on the floor, but he doesn't know who it belongs to" (R. 179: 20).
Cameron did not ask Ferry how long he had known the syringe was in the car (R. 197:
35). Nor did Cameron ask who had been in the car earlier that day or when was the last
time the car had been cleaned (R. 197: 35).
Cameron proceeded to search the vehicle and found a wooden box containing
marijuana underneath the driver's seat (R. 197: 22-23). Park admitted to Cameron that
the box and marijuana were his (R. 197: 24).
Cameron testified that the syringe was not testified for fingerprints merely because
"it's not practice to take fingerprints off of items like that" (R. 197: 24). The syringe
tested positive for methamphetamine (R. 197: 26). Cameron did not check Ferry for any
needle marks on his body (R. 197: 27). Moreover, Cameron did not submit anyone to
drug tests in order to see if anyone would test positive for methamphetamine (R. 179:
33). Cameron knew that one passenger, Sarah Bizwell, had a long history of drug abuse,

but she was not asked to take a drug test (R. 197: 34). Cameron also did not have the
syringe tested for blood or DNA evidence (R. 197: 36).
Cameron arrested Ferry and transported him to the county jail (R. 197: 27).
Cameron had a conversation with Ferry enroute to the jail, and without advising Ferry of
his Miranda rights, he learned that Ferry had "been addicted to drugs and had a problem
with drugs for the past few years. His drug of choice was meth and he - the last time he
had a hit or a dose of meth was ten hours ago, prior to me making contact with him" (R.
197: 27, 39).
Cameron also arrested Park and charged him with possession of marijuana and
methamphetamine (R. 197: 30). However, Park's father is Detective Todd Park with the
Salt Lake City Police Department and Park's charges, for some unexplained reason, were
dismissed (R. 197:30,32).
Testimony of Scott David Ferry
Scott David Ferry testified that on the November 15, 2003, he was with his friends
driving to another friend's house when they were pulled over for driving without
headlights on (R. 197: 42-44). Ferry testified that when they stopped, the driver crouched
down "trying to stash stuff (R. 197: 45). The officer asked everyone for the l.D.'s, then
had the driver step out of the car first, then the other passengers (R. 197: 45-46).
Ferry testified that he told the officer he knew that the syringe was there and that it
was not his (R. 197: 46). Ferry was arrested and on the way to jail, they "were talking
about drug use and I told him that I - that I did use drugs and that my drug of choice was
meth, but that wasn't - that wasn't my needle in the car" (R. 197: 47). The officer never

gave Ferry a Miranda warning (R. 197: 47). Ferry also testified that he never told the
officer that he had used methamphetamine 10 hours earlier (R. 197: 47).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Ferry asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he knowingly and
intentionally possessed a controlled substance or drug paraphernalia. The only evidence
linking Ferry to the charges was that he was sitting near where the syringe was found, his
knowing that it was there, and his alleged statement taken in violation of Miranda that he
used drugs and had used methamphetamine ten hours prior to his arrest. This evidence is
insufficient to prove a nexus between Ferry and syringe to support a finding that he is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, the evidence establishes that it is more
reasonable to believe that the syringe belonged to another person other than Ferry.
In the alternative, Ferry asserts his trial counsel' s performance constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to timely file a motion to suppress statements
obtained in violation of his rights per Miranda. Ferry was interrogated in a police car
while en route to the county jail without being read his rights. Trial counsel knew about
this violation, but filed an untimely motion that was not considered by the trial court. But
for this deficient performance, evidence of Ferry's prior drug use would not have been
considered. Without such evidence, Ferry would not have been convicted.

ARGUMENT
L

THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH BEYOND
A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT FERRY POSSESSED A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE OR DRUG PARAPHERNALIA

Ferry asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he knowingly and
intentionally possessed a controlled substance or drug paraphernalia and that it was plain
error for the trial court to submit the case to the jury.
An unpreserved claim can be addressed on appeal if the "defendant can
demonstrate that... 'plain error' occurred." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^f 11, 10 P.3d
346 (quoting Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996); State v. Lopez, 886
P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994)). To establish plain error in the context of an insufficiency
claim, "a defendant must demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support a
conviction of the crime charged...." Holgate, 2000 UT 71 at ^ 17. "To demonstrate that
the evidence is insufficient to support a jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must
marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is
insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins,
1999 UT 98, % 14, 989 P.2d 1065 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins, Exck, 817 P.2d 789,
799 (Utah 1991)). "[W]e will conclude that the evidence was insufficient when, after
viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the
jury's verdict the evidence i s sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such
that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at % 18
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). Then the defendant must

show "that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in
submitting the case to the jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^ 17.

A,

The evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.

The State relied solely on circumstantial evidence in an attempt to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Ferry exercised dominion or control over the drugs in question.
The only evidence connecting Ferry to the drugs found in the car was the fact that he was
sitting nearby where the drugs were found and his statement made while riding in the
police car that he had used methamphetamine in the past and that he knew the syringe
was in the car, but the drugs were not his. Ferry asserts that this circumstantial evidence
is insufficient to establish the test for constructive possession.
"[T]o show constructive possession, the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the drugs were subject to the defendant's dominion and control and the
defendant had the intent to exercise that control." State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 16, 985
P.2d 911. "However, persons who might know of the whereabouts of illicit drugs and
who might even have access to them, but who have no intent to obtain and use the drugs
can not be convicted of possession of a controlled substance. Knowledge and ability to
possess do not equal possession where there is no evidence of intent to make use of that
knowledge and ability." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). Moreover, a
defendant's *cmere occupancy of a portion of the premises where the drug[s were] found
cannot, without more, support a finding" that defendant knowingly and intentionally
possessed a controlled substance. State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1987).

Furthermore, "jwjhere the only evidence presented against the defendant is
circumstantial, the evidence supporting a conviction must preclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence. This is because the existence of a reasonable hypothesis of
innocence necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt." State v. Hill,
727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (plurality opinion) (citing State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216,
219 (Utah 1976)).
In State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1998), affirmed 1999 UT 79, 985
P.2d 911, Layman and his father, Hobart Layman (Hobart), went to the home of Gina
Ziegenhirt (Gina). Id. at 784. Hobart asked Gina if she wanted to go with them to Vernal
and make some money on the sale of methamphetamine. Id. Gina had never met
Layman, and Layman was upset with Hobart for inviting Gina. Id. The three arrived in
Vernal early in the morning and went directly to a motel. Id. While there, Gina saw
Hobart in the bathroom with drugs and heard him complain that his scales were not
working correctly. After twenty minutes, they left the hotel and Layman dropped Hobart
off, at which time Hobart handed Gina a pouch containing drugs and paraphernalia. Id.
Gina assumed the drugs Hobart gave her were hers and Hobart's. Id.
A short time later, the police stopped Layman for a faulty taillight. Layman, 953
P.2d at 784. Before Layman stopped, he jerked his car suddenly to the right and then to
the left before stopping his car in a position perpendicular to the police car. Id. Layman
walked Cwbriskly" toward the officer and was told his light was not working. Id. Layman
then opened the car trunk and tried to fix the taillight. Id. Layman's eyes wer red.

bloodshot, watery, and glassy, and he appeared very anxious and fidgety, unable to
remain in one location for any length of time. Id.
In response to questioning from the officer, Layman told him that he had no drugs
or open containers in his car and he consented to a search of the vehicle. A quick search
of Layman revealed no weapons, but the officer did see a pouch stuffed in Gina's
waistband. Id. The officer tried to obtain the pouch from Gina, and while doing so, Gina
looked nervously toward Layman and Layman shook his head in a negative fashion back
and forth. Id. The officer finally obtained the pouch and discovered it contained
numerous syringes, a spoon, a large baggy of methamphetamine, and a set of plastic
scales. Id. Two of the syringes had been used and the quantity of methamphetamine was
more than one would have for one's personal use. Id. However, at no time did the
officer see the pouch or its contents in Layman's physical custody and at no time during
the course of the stop did he observe any movements indicating Layman had handed
anything to Gina. Id. at 785.
Field sobriety tests were conducted on Layman and the officers concluded that he
was under the influence and incapable of driving. Layman was also given a blood test
which showed the presence of methamphetamine in his blood stream. Layman, 953 P.2d
at 785.
A bench trial was held and Layman was convicted for driving under the influence
of drugs or alcohol, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and
possession of paraphernalia. Id. at 784. On appeal, Layman challenged, among other

things, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding of constructive possession.
Id.
This Court concluded that the evidence adequately "supports a conclusion that
Layman was under the influence of drugs, it does not [however,] support, beyond a
reasonable doubt, a finding that Layman had the knowledge, ability, and intent to
exercise dominion and control over the contraband found on Gina's person." Layman,
953 P.2d at 789. This Court further found that the State failed to produce any evidence,
"beyond a reasonable doubt... that Layman knew about Hobart's drug transactions or the
contents of Gina's pouch.... There is not a sufficient quality or quantity of evidence ...
indicating or from which a fact finder could infer that Layman was present at any time
during which Hobart and Gina discussed their drug transaction, that he was aware he was
driving his father to Vernal to complete that transaction, that he was present in the motel
room or within hearing range while Hobart weighed and discussed the drugs with Gina,
or that he was a ware of the contents of the pouch that Hobart had given Gina." Id. at
789-790.
This Court found that this circumstantial evidence provides other reasonable
hypotheses of Lawman's innocence. Layman, 953 P.2d at 790. This Court then stated
that the circumstantial evidence did unot exclude the possibility" that Layman was
unaware about the drugs in Gina's pouch. Id. This Court noted that Layman did not
attempt to flee after being stopped and that no drugs were found in his car or on his
person, nor did Layman make any furtive "movements indicating [he] had handed
anything to Gina." Id.

Moreover, this Court disputed the State's assertion that Layman's "drug use
supports a conclusion that [he] must have had access to and control over the drugs...."
Layman, 953 P.2d at 791. This Court noted that there was no evidence suggesting that
Hobart or Gina shared in Layman's drug use or that either received enjoyment from
Layman's use. Id. Thus, there was no basis to support a finding of "mutual use and
enjoyment" which otherwise might support a finding of joint participation. Id.
Finally, this Court dispatched the State's assertion that Layman's shaking his head
when the officer searched Gina indicated knowledge and some type of control over the
drugs. Layman, 953 P.2d at 791. Even if Layman was aware of the drugs in the pouch, it
was "equally plausible" that Layman was only giving Gina advice not to incriminate
herself or he was merely expressing frustration that he was with a person caught with
drugs. Id.
In conclusion, this Court held that Layman's convictions were based on
"conjectures and probabilities" and "inference upon inference." Layman, 953 P.2d at
792, 791. Accordingly, this Court reversed Layman's conviction for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute. Id. at 792. The Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that there were insufficient "facts which
show that the accused intended to use the drugs or paraphernalia as his own." Layman;
1999 UT 79 at \ 13.
In State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah App. 1991), police received a tip from an
infonnant that the defendant would be in possession of cocaine during his lunch hour. Id.
at 1386. The police ran a check through the State computer to determine whether the

defendant had a valid driver's license. Id. No valid driver's license was found, even
though the defendant had one. Id. At noon, the officers observed the defendant leave his
place of employment with two other men and enter a vehicle matching the description
given by the informant. Id. at 1387. The police stopped the defendant for driving without
a license and told the defendant that they received a tip that the defendant would be in
possession of cocaine. Id. The defendant told the officers that he did not "have anything
to worry about," and consented to a search of his vehicle. Id. During a search of the
vehicle, the officers discovered a package containing cocaine in the crack of the backseat
on the driver's side of the vehicle. Id. When the officers discovered the cocaine, the
defendant testified "they put it there." Id.
This Court held that "[a] sufficient nexus is not established by mere ownership
and/or occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs were found ... especially when
occupancy is not exclusive." Salas, 820 P.2d at 1389. (citation omitted). Additionally,
this Court stated:
In order to find that the accused was in possession of drugs found in an automobile
he was not the sole occupant of, and did not have sole access to, there must be
other evidence to buttress such an inference. The law has recognized several
particular evidentiary factors linking or tending to link an accused with drugs.
These include incriminating statements, suspicious or incriminating behavior, sale

of drugs, use of drugs, proximity of defendant to location of drugs, drugs in plain
view, and drugs on defendant's person. *
Id.
This Court, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
held that the factual evidence was inconclusive as to whether the defendant knew of or
possessed the cocaine. Salas, 820 P.2d at 1389. The Court observed that the defendant's
wife was the co-owner of the vehicle and there were two passengers in the vehicle at the
time of arrest. Id. Further, the passengers had better access to the spot where the cocaine
was found. Id. The Court also stated that the "defendant denied the presence of cocaine
before the search, did not try to escape during the search ... and did not have drugs or
paraphernalia on his person at the time of arrest." Id. Moreover, one of the backseat
passengers sitting behind the defendant "moved around just before the stop." Id. at 1388.
The Court concluded "[t]his furtive movement, coupled with the fact that the cocaine was
found under the backseat where a passenger had been sitting, renders the remaining
evidence sufficiently inconclusive as to whether defendant knew of the presence of the
cocaine or had the intent to exercise dominion and control over the cocaine." Id.
In Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, 975 P.2d 501, the Spanish Fork
Police Department received information that drugs were being used at the defendant's
and her husband's residence. Id. at If 2. Police officers searched the residence's garbage
can and found residue containing methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana. Id. That

It must be noted that the finding of any one of the evidentiary factors listed above is not determinative; that
evidence must still be considered within the totality of the circumstances presented. State v. Layman, 953 P.2d at
788-789 (Utah App. 1998).

same day, the officers obtained a search warrant and searched the home finding "a roach
clip, scissors, clippers, zig-zags (papers used to roll cigarettes), and 'antique' prescription
pill bottles dated from 1968 to 1978." Id. Officers also found "hypodermic needles,
hermostats, and a photograph of six men, including defendant's husband, in which two of
the men were smoking a bong. The hypodermic needles were found beneath the mattress
of the bed defendant shared with her husband." Id. All other items were found in plain
view of the investigating officers. Id. The defendant was subsequently convicted for
possession of drug paraphernalia. Id. at ^f 1.
This Court in Bryan observed that the defendant was not present when the items
were found; there was no evidence that the defendant used or intended to use the items
for illegal purposes; there "was no evidence that [the defendant] participated in the
mutual use of the items seized"; and the defendant made no incriminating statements. Id.
at f 9. This Court stated, "Here, the necessary nexus between defendant and the items
seized does not exist." Id. at % 10. This Court further stated that the conviction was based
entirely upon inferences, and thus "the factual evidence in this case is inconclusive as to
whether she possessed the items found in her home." Id. at ^f 11. This Court concluded
that this "circumstantial evidence" was insufficient to prove constructive possession. Id.
at ffi['s 10-11.
In the present case, there was insufficient evidence to establish a sufficient nexus
between Ferry and the drugs or paraphernalia to permit a factual inference that the he had
the power and the intent to exercise control over those drugs or paraphernalia. Only two
witnesses testified at trial, Deputy Kent Cameron and Ferry. The following is a

summation of the marshaled evidence which would support the jury verdict. Cameron
testified that when he pulled the vehicle over, he saw the driver, Corey Park, moving
around and bending down to the floor (R. 197: 15, 16, 29). Ferry, who was sitting in the
back seat directly behind the driver, made no furtive movements of any kind (R. 197: 29).
After the passengers stepped out of the vehicle, Cameron saw a syringe lying on the floor
where Ferry was sitting (R. 179: 19). Ferry told Cameron that he knew the syringe was
there, but it was not his (R. 179: 20). Ferry was arrested and Cameron transported him to
jail (R. 179: 27). While en route to jail, Cameron asked Ferry a few questions without
advising him of his Miranda rights (R. 197: 27). Through this interrogation, Cameron
learned that Ferry had "been addicted to drugs and had a drug problem with drugs for the
past few years. His drug of choice was meth and he - the last time he had a hit or a dose
of meth was ten hours ago, prior to me making contact with him" (R. 197: 39).
These statements from Deputy Cameron, including offering the syringe and the lab
report into evidence, are the complete marshaled facts that could support the jury verdict.
However, comparing the circumstantial evidence in this case with the similar factual
scenarios in Layman, Salas, and Bryan, it is clear that the evidence was insufficient to
support the jury verdict and it was plain error for the judge to submit the case to the jury.
For example, in Layman, where the defendant was pulled over for a traffic violation and
methamphetamine and syringes were found in a pouch on a passenger, the cops could
visually tell that Layman was under the influence of drugs so they had him tested.
Layman, 953 P.2d at 784. A drug test revealed that Layman had methamphetamine in his
system, and he was still heavily under the influence of the drugs. Id. Despite the fact that

he had recently used methamphetamine and was traveling with drugs in his car, this
Court found an insufficient nexus to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Layman had
the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drugs. Id. at 790. The Court
specifically found that Layman made no furtive movements which would suggest he
handed something to the passenger. Id. In fact, this Court stated that even if Layman
knew about the drugs, the evidence was still insufficient to establish he had the intent to
exercise dominion and control over them. Id.
The present case has strikingly similar facts with Layman. Both Layman and
Ferry were stopped in a vehicle, and neither was found to be in possession of drugs.
Layman, 953 P.2d at 790; (R. 197: 15, 20). It appears that both Layman and Ferry knew
about the drugs and both denied ownership of the drugs. Id. at 791; (R. 197: 20). Both
Layman and Ferry made no furtive movements inside the car which would suggest there
was no attempt to dispose of drugs on their person. Id. at 790; (R. 197: 16). However,
Layman tested positive for drugs and was clearly under the influence of
methamphetamine at the time of his arrest, whereas there was no indication that Ferry
was under the influence of drugs. Id. at 789; (R. 197: 27, 33, 36). Moreover, the officers
found fresh needle marks on Layman's arms, whereas no such marks were found on
Ferry. Id. at 793; (R. 197: 27). Although Ferry allegedly told the deputy that he did use
drugs, no drug tests were performed on Ferry or any of the passengers to determine who
was the owner of the methamphetamine in question (R. 197: 33).
This case also has similarities with Salas. Salas was not the sole occupant of the
car, just like here where there were four people in the car. Salas, 820 P.2d at 1387; (R.

197: 15). The only evidence connecting Salas to the drugs was an allegation by an
informant and being in the car where drugs were found. Id. at 1386, 1389. Moreover, the
officer observed someone other than Salas moving around in a furtive manner just before
the traffic stop, suggesting this passenger was trying to hide the drugs. Id. at 1389. The
same is true in this case. It was the driver that was moving around in a suggestive
manner, not Ferry; therefore, this evidence suggests, just like in Salas, that it was the
driver Park that was attempting to hide the methamphetamine and not Ferry (R. 197: 15).
And in Bryan, where a large amount of drug paraphernalia was found in the
defendant's home, there was insufficient evidence that Bryan used or intended to use the
items and there is insufficient evidence that Ferry used or intended to use the syringe.
Bryan, 1999 UT App 61 at ]f 9. Moreover, both Bryan and Ferry made no incriminating
statements. Id; (R. 197: 20, 27, 39). And just like Bryan, Ferry's conviction was based
entirely upon inferences since the evidence is inconclusive as to whether he exercised
dominion and control over the syringe. Id. at f 11.
The only evidence linking Ferry to the syringe is the fact that it was found in the
floorboard where his feet were after he exited the car (R. 197: 18-19). There are
numerous explanations for this, all of them more reasonable than the inference that the
syringe was Ferry's.
The most likely scenario is that the syringe belonged to Corey Park. When the
vehicle was pulled over, Park was seen making furtive movements suggesting he was
hiding something (R. 197: 15). In fact he was; a later search revealed a box containing
marijuana under Park's seat (R. 197: 22-23). Park admitted the marijuana was his, and

was charged with possession of both marijuana and methamphetamine (R. 197: 30). For
some unexplained reason, Park's charges were dismissed, even though he admitted that
the marijuana was his (R. 197: 24, 30).2 It is highly plausible that Park's charges were
dismissed because his father is a detective with the Salt Lake City Police Department (R.
197: 32). Thus, considering these facts, it is more likely that the syringe was Park's and
Park put the syringe on the floorboard when he was pulled over.
Another plausible scenario just as likely is that the syringe belonged to the other
backseat passenger Sarah Bizwell (R. 197: 34). Deputy Cameron knew that Bizwell had
a long history of drug abuse, but apparently little or no investigation was directed towards
her (R. 197: 34). In fact, the State failed to show whether or not Cameron questioned
Bizwell to determine if the syringe belonged to her. And despite Cameron's knowledge
of Bizwell's prior drug history, she was not subjected to any drug tests to determine if she
would test positive for methamphetamine (R. 197: 34). Thus, Bizwell was just as likely,
if not more likely to be the owner of the syringe.
Moreover, the State failed to show what steps Cameron took, if any, to rule out
that the syringe belonged to the passenger in the front seat. It could have been very easy
for that passenger, or any other passenger, to simply toss the syringe on the floor board.
However, Cameron apparently failed to ask this passenger as well as Bizwell if the
syringe was theirs, and if he did, the State failed to introduce that evidence.

2

The State objected to this evidence coming in on the grounds of relevance (R. 197: 30). The trial court abused its
discretion in sustaining the objection since it is relevant to show motive (R. 197: 31).

Additionally, simple blood tests were not performed on any of the passengers,
especially Park and Ferry since the record is clear that at least these two were arrested (R.
197: 30, 33). There was simply no showing made by the State that Ferry was under the
influence of drugs when he was arrested. While Cameron did testify that Ferry allegedly
said he used methamphetamine ten hours prior to the arrest, that statement is insufficient,
considering all the evidence in this case, to provide the sufficient nexus to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Ferry had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control
over the syringe. The evidence, therefore, was insufficient to support the jury's verdict.

B.

The Trial Court Committed Plain Error by Submitting the Case to the
Jury

As shown above, it is clear that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding
that Ferry constructively possessed the syringe and methamphetamine in question.
Because the evidence was obviously insufficient to support the jury verdict, the trial court
committed plain error by submitting the case to the jury. While this issue was not
preserved below, Ferry asserts that this issue must be addressed under the plain error
doctrine to "avoid injustice." See Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 13 (quoting State v. Eldridge,
773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah App. 1989).
The State's failure to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt was so obvious and
fundamental that it was plain error to submit this case to the jury. See Holgate, 2000 UT
74 at ^f 17. But for this error, Ferry would not have been convicted.

C.

Trial Counsel's Failure to Move for a Directed Verdict Constituted
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Ferry's trial counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness for failing to move for a directed verdict. Moreover, this
deficient performance affected the outcome of the trial.
The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for "failing to make a motion for
directed verdict succeeds only if the State's evidence was not sufficient to support a
conviction." State v. Reyes, 2000 UT App 310 (memorandum decision); See also Tillman
v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1050, 114 S.Ct. 706, 126
L.Ed.2d 671 (1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on failure to move to
dismiss where the evidence to convict was sufficient)).
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the defendant's burden
to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment, and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v.
Kelley, 2000 UT 41, <§ 25, 1 P.3d 546 (citation omitted). As stated above, the evidence
was insufficient as a matter of law to submit this case to the jury. Accordingly, trial
counsel's performance was deficient for failing to move for a directed verdict under the
reasoning set forth Reyes, But for this failure, this case would not have been submitted to
the jury and Ferry would not have been convicted of possession of a controlled substance
and possession of drug paraphernalia.

IL

TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE A MOTION TO
SUPPRESS STATEMENTS MADE TO DEPUTY CAMERON
CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL,
THEREBY VIOLATING HIS FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS

Five days before trial, trial counsel filed a motion to suppress statements made by
Ferry to the police while he was in custody traveling in a police car to the county jail (R.
77-79), However, this motion was untimely so the trial court never considered it (R 197:
3-6). Ferry asserts that the police interview with Deputy Cameron which took place in
his patrol car en route to the county jail was a custodial interrogation and any statements
made during or as a result of this interview violated his rights as defined in Miranda.
Furthermore, Ferry received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed
to timely file the motion to suppress.
As previously stated above, in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel,
it is the defendant's burden to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and second, that counsel's performance
prejudiced the defendant," Kelley, 2000 UT 41 at ^ 25 (citation omitted). If a defendant's
Miranda rights were actually violated and trial counsel failed to timely file a motion to
suppress and trial counsel's tardiness in bringing the suppression motion was prejudicial
to defendant, then trial counsel's assistance is considered ineffective as a matter of law.
See State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App.1993).

A.

Ferry's Fifth Amendment Rights Against Self-incrimination Were
Violated

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that defendants
shall not be "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." To secure
this fundamental right, the United States Supreme Court established procedural safeguards that must be followed during custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Statements elicited by police
during a custodial interrogation must be suppressed if a defendant has not been advised of
his constitutional rights per Miranda. State v. Larocco, 19A P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990).
'The United States Supreme Court has defined 'custodial interrogation' as
'questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Snyder,
860 P.2d at 355 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612). Additionally, "the
proper inquiry as to whether a defendant is in custody for the purposes of Miranda is
whether a reasonable person in defendant's position would believe his 'freedom of action
is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest.'" Snyder, 860 P.2d at 355 (quoting
State v. Mirquet, 844 P.2d 995, 998 (Utah App. 1992)). The United States Supreme
Court has held that "the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as
a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest.'"
Berkemer v McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)
(citation omitted).

This Court and the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly looked at four key factors
in the determination of whether a defendant is in custody for Miranda purposes: 1. The
site of the interrogation; 2. Whether the investigation focused on the accused; 3.
Whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; 4. The length and form of the
interrogation. Salt Lake City v. Carrier, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983). Ferry asserts
that these factors applied to the facts of this case are dispositive. For one, the
interrogation occurred in the patrol car en route to the county jail (R. 197: 27). Two,
Ferry was almost immediately arrested, so the investigation clearly focused on him (R.
197: 27). Three, the objective indicia of arrest were present since Ferry was formally
arrested and taken to jail (R. 197: 27). While the record is unclear on the exact time of
the interrogation, Deputy Cameron admitted to asking Ferry questions without reading
him his Miranda rights (R. 197: 27).
The factors listed in Carner may not be necessary to review considering the fact
that Ferry was formally arrested. There can be no question to the fact that he was
"formally arrested" and "in custody" for Miranda purposes. A short time after Deputy
Cameron stopped the vehicle for driving with no headlights on, he arrested Ferry and
presumably placed Ferry in handcuffs in his patrol car (R. 197: 27). Thus, at the point of
the formal arrest and certainly at the point that Ferry was placed in the patrol car, Ferry
was "in custody."
Once in custody, Ferry was entitled to a Miranda warning before any interrogation
by the police. "[Tjhe Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody
is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the

term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any
words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest
and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of
the suspect, rather than the intent of the police." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,
300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). See also Layion City v.
Aragon, 813 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah App. 1991).
Deputy Cameron testified that after he arrested Ferry and placed him in his patrol
car, he questioned him while en route to the county jail (R. 197: 27, 39-40). Despite the
obvious fact that Ferry was in custody, in a patrol car, and not free to leave, Cameron
acknowledged that he questioned Ferry without advising him of his rights per Miranda
(R. 197: 27, 39). Cameron specifically asked Ferry while en route to jail what his drug of
choice was and when was the last time he had used (R. 78). Cameron testified that in
response to his questions, Ferry said his drug of choice was methamphetamine and the
last time he used was 10 hours prior to the arrest (R. 197: 27).
Accordingly, the record clearly shows that Ferry was subjected to custodial
interrogation in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.

B.

Trial Counsel's Failure to Timely File the Motion to Suppress
Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Rule 12(c)(1)(B) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires defendants to
file motions to suppress evidence "at least five days prior to the trial." Where trial

counsel knew in advance of Miranda violations, but failed to file a motion to suppress
within five days of trial with no legitimate trial tactic of doing so, trial counsel's actions
fall "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Snyder, 860 P.2d at
359 (quoting State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986)); see also Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 669, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
The record shows that Ferry's trial counsel knew well in advance of Deputy
Cameron's failure to warn Ferry of his rights per Miranda while en route to jail. In fact,
trial counsel explained to the trial court that the only reason why the motion was filed late
was because she was under the mistaken impression that Ferry's trial would be continued,
giving her more time to file the motion (R. 197: 5). Trial counsel also acknowledged that
she was aware of the deadline, but due to her "busy schedule" she was unable to timely
file it (R. 197: 5). The State agreed that trial counsel knew of the motion well in advance
and had ample time to file it (R. 197: 4).
Ferry asserts that there was no legitimate trial strategy in failing to timely file the
motion to suppress. The fact that trial counsel filed the motion and requested the trial
court to use its discretion and consider the motion despite its untimeliness attests that her
belatedness was not trial strategy (R. 197: 3). Moreover, the substantial prejudicial affect
the statements would have against Ferry also show that the late filing was not trial
strategy. Accordingly, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file the motion
and Ferry was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.

C.

Trial Counsel's Objectively Deficient Performance Prejudiced Ferry

"Prejudice will be held to exist only where the error undermines our confidence in
the verdict against the defendant." Snyder, 860 P.2d at 359; see also Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. If a "reasonable probability exists that the jury's verdict would
have been more favorable to defendant had the information from the interview been
suppressed," then the verdict must be reversed. Id.
As shown above in Point I, the evidence against Ferry was already thin and
insufficient to support the verdict. The only evidence linking Ferry to the charges was
the fact that the syringe was found near where he was sitting (R. 197: 19); Ferry's
statement that he knew the syringe was there but it was not his (R. 197: 20); and Ferry's
alleged admission that he used drugs and that he last used methamphetamine 10 hours
prior to his arrest (R. 197: 27, 39). As shown in Point II, A, Ferry's alleged admission
was taken without being given a Miranda warning (R. 197: 27).
Had Ferry's alleged admission been suppressed, then the only evidence linking
Ferry with the charges was his sitting nearby where drugs were found and his
acknowledgment that he knew the drugs were there. There was no other evidence even
suggesting that Ferry intended to use or possess the drugs.
This Court has previously decided that where a defendant merely knows of the
existence of items and the potential for illegal use, but there is no evidence of intent to
make use of the knowledge and ability, the necessary nexus between defendant and the
illegal items does not exist. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61 at fflf's 7, 10. Such is this case.
There is simply no nexus between defendant and the illegal items without the alleged

statements taken in violation of Miranda. Accordingly, Ferry's convictions must be
reversed.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Ferry asks that this Court reverse his convictions of
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia due to
insufficient evidence. In the alternative, Ferry asks that his convictions be reversed and
the matter be remanded to the Third District Court with instructions that his statements
taken in violation of Miranda be suppressed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of November, 2004.
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ADDENDA
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Use of plea bargain or grant of immunity as
improper vouching for credibility of witness —
state cases, 58 A.L.R.4th 1229.
Ineffective assistance of counsel: misrepresentation, or failure to advise, of immigration
consequences of guilty plea — state cases, 65
A.L.R.4th 719.

Rule 12

Guilty plea as affected by fact that sentence
contemplated by plea bargain is subsequently
determined to be illegal or unauthorized, 87
A.L.R.4th 384.

Rule 12. Motions.
(a) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion,
which, unless made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in
accordance with this rule. A motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and the relief sought. A motion need not
be accompanied by a memorandum unless required by the court.
(b) Request to Submit for Decision. When the time for filing a response to a
motion and the reply has passed, either party may file a request to submit the
motion for decision. The request shall be a separate pleading captioned
"Request to Submit for Decision." The Request to Submit for Decision shall
state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing
memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. The notification shall
contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If no party files a request, the
motion will not be submitted for decision.
(c) Time for filing specified motions. Any defense, objection or request,
including request for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable
of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised prior to
trial by written motion.
(c)(1) The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial:
(c)(1)(A) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or
information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to
charge an offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at any time
during the pendency of the proceeding;
(c)(1)(B) motions to suppress evidence;
(c)(1)(C) requests for discovery where allowed;
(c)(1)(D) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or
(c)(1)(E) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy.
(c)(2) Motions for a reduction of criminal offense at sentencing pursuant to
Utah Code Section 76-3-402 shall be in writing and filed at least ten days prior
to the date of sentencing unless the court sets the date for sentencing within
ten days of the entry of conviction.
(d) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the
court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination.
Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall
state its findings on the record.
(e) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make
requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall
constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from
such waiver.
(f) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all
Proceedings at the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and
conclusions of law as are made orally.
(g) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be
|ontinued for a reasonable and specified time pending the filing of a new
Indictment or information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations.
Amended effective April 1, 1998; November 1, 2003.)

